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From 2015 onwards, Professor Sir Geoff Palmer, Jamaica's first Honorary Consul in 
Scotland, and human rights activist Adam Ramsay mounted a high-profile campaign to 
reword Edinburgh’s Melville Monument, upon which a statute of Henry Dundas is mounted. 
The rewording, in their view, more accurately reflected his parliamentary actions that delayed 
the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. After another infamous delay in deciding 
Dundas’ role in ‘gradual abolition’, a new version was hastily agreed in June 2020:    
Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville (1742 – 1811) …was the Scottish Lord 
Advocate and an MP for Edinburgh and Midlothian, and the First Lord of the 
Admiralty…While Home Secretary in 1792 and first Secretary of State for War in 
1796 he was instrumental in deferring the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Slave 
trading by British ships was not abolished until 1807. As a result of this delay, more 
than half a million enslaved Africans crossed the Atlantic…In 2020 this was 
dedicated to the memory of the more than half a million Africans whose enslavement 
was a consequence of Henry Dundas’s actions.2 
 
Although the wording has not been universally accepted, the plaque was approved on 17 
March 2021; by which time the debate had moved beyond Scotland.3 The city of Toronto in 
Canada also initiated an investigation of Dundas Street, named by the first Lieutenant-
Governor of Upper Canada in 1793.4 The debate focuses on Dundas’ parliamentary activities, 
rather than any accusation of profiteering from chattel slavery. For he was one of the most 
important statesmen in the late-eighteenth-century British Parliament, and preeminent 
Scottish politician. Dundas’ stellar career is explained by his relationship with close friend 
and ally, Prime Minister William Pitt (the younger). Acting as ‘Scottish manager’, Dundas 
dispensed patronage and controlled a personal party of MPs in the House of Commons, 
 
1 Research for this article was supported by the Annie Dunlop Endowment (2018-19) at the University of 
Glasgow. An earlier version of this paper was presented at ‘Historians on Dundas and Slavery’ (The University 
of Edinburgh online event, July 2020). The author is grateful for comments and feedback from Diana Paton and 
two anonymous reviewers. The author also thanks Christer Petley for discussions on the Dundas/Taylor 
relationship and generous sharing of material from the Taylor papers.     
2 Adam Ramsay, ‘Edinburgh to add new plaque to prominent Dundas statue after Black Lives Matter protests’, 
Available: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/instrumental-in-deferring-the-abolition-of-the-
slave-trade-controversial-edinburgh-statue-to-be-given-new-plaque/ Accessed: 10 July 2020. 
3 ‘An enormous victory for Edinburgh and the people of Scotland’, Edinburgh Evening News, Available: 
https://www.edinburghnews.scotsman.com/heritage-and-retro/retro/an-enormous-victory-for-edinburgh-and-the-
people-of-scotland-reaction-to-melville-monument-slavery-plaque-3169619 Accessed: 18 March 2020. See, for 
example, ‘Rewording of Henry Dundas plaque bad history, says Sir Tom Devine’, The Times, 26 October 2020, 
Available: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rewording-of-henry-dundas-plaque-bad-history-says-sir-tom-
devine-2bc5f3jw8 Accessed: 12 December 2020. 
4 ‘City of Toronto: Responding to the Dundas Street Renaming Petition’, Available: 
https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2020/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-156448.pdf Accessed: 6 February 2021. 
 
holding several positions over two Pitt ministries (1783-1801; 1804-6).5 As Home Secretary 
(1791-4), Dundas introduced ‘gradually’ to leading parliamentary abolitionist William 
Wilberforce’s motion in the House of Commons on 2 April 1792 that called for the 
immediate abolition of the slave trade.6 Although the intentions remain disputed, the 
consequences are not. Abolition eventually passed on 25 March 1807, fifteen years after 
Dundas’ intervention. From 1793, over two thousand more triangular voyages departed 
British ports, carrying over 583,000 African men, women and children - almost 20% of 
overall British trafficking between 1628 and 1808.7 If proven that Dundas delayed abolition, 
he was guilty of a political strategy with catastrophic consequences for African people 
forcibly trafficked into chattel slavery - a system described as ‘institutionalized 
manslaughter’.8  
Explanations for the late-eighteenth century rise of British abolitionism, and 
ultimately the act of 1807, have been grouped under broad headings: 
ideological/humanitarian principles (evangelicalism, anti-slavery ideals, public opinion), 
economic forces that made abolition convenient (decline of the West India economy, free 
labour ideology), alongside resistance of the enslaved and quest for self-emancipation.9 The 
parliamentary movement for the abolition of the slave trade was fought between 1787 and 
1807. A subsequent campaign to abolish plantation slavery lasted from 1823 until 
emancipation in 1834. This article is concerned with the former. Political factors mooted to 
have contributed to this long delay in the abolition of the slave trade include the lack of 
cabinet agreement in the Pitt and Addington governments, known royal hostility, and strength 
of the parliamentary West India interest. Abolitionism also attracted suspicion due to a 
perceived association with Jacobinism, whilst there was fear of a similar insurrection like in 
the French colony of Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti) in August 1791. It was considered 
necessary, by those anticipating a successful British colonial occupation that never came, to 
prolong the trafficking to rebuild Haiti’s sugar estates. However, Dundas described the 
 
5 David J. Brown, ‘The Government of Scotland under Henry Dundas and William Pitt’, History, 83/270 (April 
1998), 265-279. 
6 The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-Trade, In the House of Commons on Monday the Second 
of April 1792 (n.d.), 127; R.G. Thorne, ‘Henry Dundas (1742-1811), of Melville Castle, Edinburgh’, History of 
Parliament Online, Available: https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member/dundas-
henry-1742-1811 Accessed: 10 February 2020. 
7 The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, Available: http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates 
Accessed: 10 February 2020. This represented around 18% of the British trafficking total in eight-percent of 
British slave trade era. 
8 Christer Petley, White Fury: A Jamaican Slaveholder and the Age of Revolution, (Oxford 2018), 173. 
9 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, (London: Billing and Sons, 1981 edn.). For a recent summary, see 
Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism, (Chapel Hill, 2006), 1-30. 
 
strategy to possess the colony as a ‘war for security’ rather than one for riches. Indeed, as 
Roger Buckley argued, after 1795 the British government - including Pitt and Dundas – 
sought to prolong the Africa trafficking to enhance the British army’s military capability.10  
There are two irreconcilable schools of thought regarding Dundas’ role within the 
delay. The pessimist school view his actions in a cynical manner. Distinguished Caribbean 
historian Eric Williams described Dundas as a determined ‘enemy of abolition’.11 Roger 
Anstey also characterised Dundas’ parliamentary activities as anti-abolitionist in nature. 
Anstey noted Dundas’ intervention in 1792, but especially his role in March 1796 when he 
personally opposed abolition and mobilised Scottish MPs to the cause. For Anstey, Dundas 
was the ‘most important cause of the failure of immediate abolition in the period up to 
1796’.12 Similarly, David Brion Davis viewed Dundas’s supposedly abolitionist reforms of 
23 April 1792 with suspicion as they preceded ‘vehement opposition’ to abolition itself.13 
Historians of slavery and abolition, including Seymour Drescher, endorse versions of the 
Anstey-Davis interpretation.14 Most recently, Douglas Hamilton underlined that Dundas was 
‘no abolitionist’.15  
Dale H. Porter was equivocal when describing Dundas as a far-sighted stateman in 
1792 who ‘in a way no abolitionist had dared do…openly explored the long-range prospects 
of West Indian society’ yet simultaneously acknowledged the ‘question of his sincerity will 
 
10 Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (New Jersey, 1975), 343-363. 
Roger N. Buckley, ‘The British Army's African Recruitment Policy, 1790-1807’, Contributions in Black 
Studies, 5/2, (2008), 10-11. David Geggus, ‘The British Government and the Saint Domingue Slave Revolt, 
1791-1793’, The English Historical Review, 96/379 (April 1981), 286. 
11 Eric Williams, The Economic Aspect of the Abolition of the West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery, (Maryland, 
2014 edition), 27-28 
12 Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, 308-09, 314-315. 
13 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823, (Ithaca and London, 1975), 
432. 
14 Hugh Thomas viewed Dundas as a ‘formidable parliamentary opponent for the abolitionists’ without whose 
‘skilful obstructions the slave trade would have been abolished in 1796, if not 1792’, see The Slave Trade: 
History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870, (London, 1998), 527, 549; Brycchan Carey described how 
Henry Dundas ‘effectively wrecked abolition with his gradualist amendment’ of 1792, which gave the West 
India interest ‘room to manoeuvre’. For Carey, gradual abolition effectively meant ‘no abolition’, see British 
Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment and Slavery, 1760-1807, (Basingstoke, 2005), 
186, 191; Iain Whyte described Dundas as the proposer of the amendment that ‘effectively delayed abolition for 
nearly two decades’, see Scotland and the Abolition of Black Slavery, 1756-1838 (Edinburgh, 2006), 89; 
Stephen Farrell, ‘“Contrary to the Principles of Justice, Humanity and Sound Policy”: The Slave Trade, 
Parliamentary Politics and the Abolition Act, 1807’, Parliamentary History, 26/4, (2007), 141-202; for Roger 
Buckley, Dundas was one of the ‘leading opponents of abolition’, see ‘African Recruitment Policy’, 11; 
Srividhya Swaminathan, Debating the Slave Trade: Rhetoric of British National Identity, 1759–1815, (Farnham, 
2009), 203-4; Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition. Second Edition, (Chapel 
Hill, 2010 edn.), 119; Stephen Tomkins, The Clapham Sect: How Wilberforce’s Circle Transformed Britain, 
(Oxford, 2010), 99. 
15 Douglas Hamilton, ‘Defending the Colonies against Malicious Attacks of Philanthropy’: Scottish Campaigns 
against the Abolitions of the Slave Trade and Slavery’, in A. Macinnes & D. Hamilton (eds.), Jacobitism, 
Enlightenment and Empire, 1680–1820 (London, 2014), 193-208.  
 
never be settled’.16 Others in an optimist school, mainly biographers, view Henry Dundas’ 
actions in a more positive manner.17 In 1933, biographer Cyril Matheson exonerated Dundas 
by describing him as a defender of ‘neither slavery nor the slave-trade’ and claimed the 
records of the London Society of West India Planters and Merchants - the most powerful pro-
slavery lobbying group in the British-Atlantic world – revealed he often ‘resisted their 
pretensions’.18 In the Dundas Despotism (1992) Michael Fry has become the Dundas 
defender par excellence. Based upon parliamentary contributions, Fry claimed Dundas’ 
political compromise in April 1792 eased abolition into legislation.19 The well-evidenced 
charges levelled by Anstey and Davis against Dundas for 1796 were ignored in favour of a 
positive interpretation of earlier events. Fry’s stance has recently been endorsed in a note by 
Brian Young, although he similarly disregarded Dundas’ anti-abolition activities after 1792.20 
Fry has recently mounted a high-profile public defence. Dundas’ role in gradual abolition was 
omitted from the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB) in 2009.21 Fry went 
further in June 2020, claiming that ‘Dundas was a genuine opponent of the slave trade’.22 
T.M. Devine endorsed Fry’s explanations.23 In doing so, Devine retracted his written opinion 
of 2015, when he claimed that Dundas’s ‘parliamentary intervention in 1792 arguing for 
gradual abolition effectively killed off reform for a generation…he received grateful thanks 
from influential members of the West India interest for his support’.24 In October 2020, 
Devine publicly recanted: ‘the end of the slave trade in the British Empire by British 
 
16 Dale H. Porter, The Abolition of the Slave Trade in England, (U.S., 1970), 80-83. 
17 As is typical of the genre, biographers generally defend Dundas - except Holden Furber who appears to 
concede he acted on Government orders to prolong the trafficking in enslaved people: ‘the slave trade was an 
evil, but the King’s Government had to be carried on. Someone had to “get things done”, and Dundas was the 
man to do them’. See Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811: Political Manager of Scotland, 
Statesman, Administrator of British India, (London, 1931), 294.   
18 Cyril Matheson, The Life of Henry Dundas: First Viscount Melville, (London, 1933), 160. 
19 Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism, (Edinburgh, 2004 edn.), 200. 
20 ‘A Letter from Brian Young, Professor of Intellectual History at Oxford University. 
Christ Church, Oxford’, 15 June 2020, Available: https://medium.com/@bobbymelville1/if-we-pervert-the-
facts-of-history-how-can-we-progress-in-our-future-3f07eea5d762 Accessed: 11 July 2020 
21 Michael Fry, ‘Dundas, Henry, first Viscount Melville (1742–1811), politician’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. 23 Sep. 2004; Accessed 14 Jun. 2020.  
22 Michel Fry, ‘Here’s the real truth on Henry Dundas and whether he ‘prolonged’ slavery’, The National, 16 
June 2020. Available: https://www.thenational.scot/news/18519171.real-truth-henry-dundas-whether-prolonged-
slavery/ Accessed: 8 July 2020. 
23 ‘Dundas kept saying ‘now is not the time’ to end slavery’, 17 June 2020, Available: 
https://www.thenational.scot/news/18521553.dundas-kept-saying-now-not-time-end-slavery/ Accessed: 9 July 
2020. 
24 T.M. Devine, ‘Lost to History’, in T.M. Devine (ed.), Recovering Scotland’s Slavery Past: The Caribbean 
Connection, (Edinburgh, 2015), 31. 
 
Government decision in the 1790s was well-nigh impossible. Dundas’ role in this was either 
non-existent or peripheral’.25  
The pessimist view of Henry Dundas’ role in gradual abolition has a more solid 
empirical foundation. The activist narrative is consistent with historiographical orthodoxy, 
explaining why this version has been endorsed in civic Scotland. Yet, the optimist view is 
currently prioritised by biographers and flourishes due to absences in the ODNB and 
journalistic outputs. Given this scholarly paradox and international interest, this article 
reassesses Henry Dundas’ activities. Firstly, contributions in the Houses of Parliament 
between 1791 and 1807 are examined in detail and situated in the appropriate imperial 
context. Memoirs and published pamphlets reveal how contemporaries viewed Dundas’ 
activities and motives at the time and since. Importantly, parliamentary activities are 
compared with new insights from personal correspondence as well as public and private 
communications from West India societies, merchants and planters. By overlaying 
parliamentary events with commercial networks, this article illuminates collaboration with 
the West India interest and how this operated and was perceived at the time. In doing so, this 
article - the first detailed study of its type - clarifies Dundas’ role as a ‘great delayer’ of 
abolition. 
The Quakers sent the first abolitionist petition to the British Parliament in 1783, 
although the political movement did not begin for another four years. William Wilberforce 
led the parliamentary lobby: his first motion in April 1791 was heavily defeated in the House 
of Commons. Dundas was not present, did not vote nor comment due to what he later 
described as ‘indisposition’.26 According to historian John Ehrman, Dundas was already 
‘against immediate abolition’ by this point.27 The diaries of Bishop Beilby Porteus, an 
associate of Wilberforce, provide insights into parliamentary debates. As Bishop of Chester 
(1776-1787) and Bishop of London (1787-1808), Porteus was a member of the House of 
Lords during a crucial period. Describing the defeat of Wilberforce’s first motion in the 
Commons as the ‘greatest majority that I believe was ever known [163-88] in any instance 
when all the Reason & Justice of the case’, which he attributed to the pro-slave trade alliance: 
 
25 Parisa Urquhart’s Scotland, Slavery and Statues for BBC Scotland, aired on 20 October 2020. See also 
‘Midlothian slave trader row continues’, Midlothian Advertiser, Available: 
https://www.midlothianadvertiser.co.uk/news/people/midlothian-slave-trader-row-continues-3010312 Accessed: 
23 October 2020. 
26 The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-Trade, In the House of Commons on Monday and 
Tuesday, April 18 and 19, 1791, (London, 1792), 123; The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-
Trade, In the House of Commons on Monday the Second of April 1792, (n.p., n.d.), 94. 
27 John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim, (London, 1969), 399, f.2. 
 
‘against these [the abolitionist parliamentarians] was something more powerful than 
argument or eloquence; the Influence, Interest & extensive connections of the W.I. Planters, 
merchants and African Traders’.28 
Bishop Porteus’ reference to the powerful influence of West India interests – both in 
metropolitan society and in Parliament - was well founded: they were arguably the most 
powerful commercial lobby in the pre-reform era.29 Michael W. McCahill’s recent analysis 
suggests 56 to 58 MPs with West India connections sat across the life of the 1784 Parliament. 
The 1790 Parliament began with fifty-five MPs with West India connections, which rose 
within the parliamentary term to sixty (in 1792), to sixty-four (in 1794), then a slight decline 
to sixty-three in 1796. Thus, West India support increased across both Parliaments.30 
McCahill’s estimates revise understandings of the relative strength of the West India interest. 
Anstey identified at least eighty-three MPs that voted for abolition at least once between 1791 
and 1796, although ‘committed abolitionists…numbered about thirty’.31 Thus, McCahill’s 
estimates for the 1790 Parliament (which saw several votes on abolition up to 1 May 1796) 
suggests MPs who tended to side with the pro-slave trade cause were at least as twice as 
powerful as steadfast abolitionists.  
The Society of West India Planters and Merchants provided support to the 
parliamentary West India interest and vice versa. Separate merchant and planter bodies in 
London combined in January 1775. These groups maintained distinctive identities but 
organised under the auspices of what has become known as the London West India 
Committee, established 1782. David Beck Ryden suggest a more appropriate title could have 
been the Society of Jamaica Planters and Merchants as this group dominated the leadership. 
The executive committee – and several sub-committees established for specific purposes – 
provided a platform for wider collaboration.32 The ‘Sub Committee Appointed to Oppose the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade’, for example, was established in 1788 and enlarged four years 
 
28 Lambeth Palace Library, [LPL], Diaries and Memoranda of Beilby Porteus, Bishop of London, 1791, MS 
2100, fo. 33. 
29 G.P. Judd, Members of Parliament, 1734-1832 (New Haven, 1955), 89; Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, 286, 
297; Davis, Problem of Slavery, 430, and footnote 77; Andrew O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a 
Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution’, The 
Historical Journal, 40/1, (1997), 72-74. 
30 Michael W. McCahill, (ed), The Correspondence of Stephen Fuller, 1788-1795: Jamaica, The West India 
Interest at Westminster and the Campaign to Preserve the Slave Trade (West Sussex, 2014), 47-51. 
31 Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, 282-3. 
32 David Beck Ryden, West India Slavery and British Abolition, 1783-1807, (Cambridge, 2009), 81, 191-5; The 
Public Advertiser, 11 January 1775, 1. For a brief account, see Douglas Hall, A Brief History of the West India 
Committee, (Barbados, 1971), 3-4. For studies of their lobbying activities, see Beck Ryden, West India Slavery, 
and Angelina Osborne, ‘Power and persuasion: the London West India Committee, 1783-1833’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, (University of Hull, 2014). 
 
later with a propagandic function to ‘defend the Cause of the Colonies’. In 1792-3 alone, over 
£2,000 was spent defending the slave trade, twice the abolitionist budget committed to 
attacking it.33 
Jamaica planter Simon Taylor returned to England in the summer of 1791 to lobby 
against abolition, and naturally associated with the London West India interest. Although 
born in Kingston, Taylor was of Scottish descent. And, as Christer Petley notes, Taylor was 
probably the wealthiest West Indian enslaver of all. Given such prominence, it was 
unsurprising he cultivated a close relationship with Henry Dundas.34 Taylor invited Dundas 
to dinner in early January 1792 and, although these conversations are not recorded, offers of 
mutual assistance would not have been out of place given how readily the latter dispensed 
patronage amongst Scots.35 The relationship immediately became more professional. 
Between January and March 1792, the London West India Committee - sometimes with 
Taylor in the chair - routinely sent communications to Dundas.36 In March 1792, minutes 
from a general meeting described the state of the sugar trade, no doubt intended to influence 
parliamentary strategy. In Dundas’ surviving records, the minutes sit alongside – suggesting 
they were sent simultaneously - a petition. Titled the ‘Legal claim of the British sugar 
colonies to enjoy an exclusive right of supplying this kingdom with sugars’, it called for the 
continuation of the slave trade as: ‘being accused of no crime, they should not be compelled 
to make a sacrifice’.37 Crucially, the West India interest demanded compensation if they were 
faced with diminishing returns from a decreasing enslaved labour force after abolition.38  
As the parliamentary West India interest consolidated, public opposition gathered 
momentum. Over 500 abolitionist petitions flooded into the British Parliament in 1792; 
according to Seymour Drescher, the most sent to the House of Commons on a single 
subject.39 In his role as MP for Edinburgh, Henry Dundas transmitted a petition on behalf of 
 
33 University of London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies [ICS], West India Committee Records, M915, Reel 
11: Sub Committee of West India Planters & Merchants appointed to oppose the abolition of the slave trade 
minutes; Lowell Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833, (New York, 1928), 
268; Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, 292. 
34 Petley, White Fury, 3, 19, 141, 262. 
35 Douglas Hamilton, Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World, 1750-1815, (Manchester, 2005), 171-7; 
ICS 120, Taylor Family Papers, 13/A/1: Robert Taylor to Simon Taylor, 28 December 1791.  
36 See, for example, ICS, West India Committee Records, M915, Reel 3: West India Planters and Merchants 
minutes 1785-1822, 19 March 1792. 
37 National Records of Scotland [NRS], Papers of the Dundas Family, GD51/1/361/1-15: Documents relating to 
the price of sugar and the regulations governing the sugar trade, 13 January-23 March 1792. 
38 Lowell Ragatz, A Guide for the Study of British Caribbean History, 1763-1834, (Washington, 1932), 255. 
39 Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective, (Oxford, 
1986), 80 
 
the Edinburgh abolition committee.40 Dundas delivered the petition on 2 April 1792 - the 
very day that Wilberforce again raised the question of immediate abolition in the House of 
Commons.41 Wilberforce opened by noting that the ‘real nature’ of transatlantic trafficking 
had been revealed in parliamentary inquiries (1788-1790) and the House of Commons should 
avoid sanctioning ‘the continuance of this infernal traffick’.42 Dundas noted the irreconcilable 
positions: the continuance of trafficking from Africa forevermore, or immediate abolition. As 
Home Secretary, he argued for the middle-ground of gradual abolition which included 
reforms ‘with a view of putting an end to hereditary slavery, and relieving the condition of 
the slaves’. Dundas’s supposed aim was to: ‘gradually and experimentally to prove the 
practicability of the Abolition of the African Trade, and to provide the means of cultivation, 
and to increase the population’.43 The gradual abolition of Africa trafficking would have 
complemented the simultaneous emancipation of enslaved people, which was dependent 
upon the agreement of West India planters. These were more ambitious than proposed by 
Wilberforce, although they were never viable. In 1798, Rev. Thomas Gisborne, member of 
the Clapham Sect, described Dundas’ earliest suggestions as ‘so clogged with extreme 
difficulties’, especially the emancipation of enslaved children, that they would have alarmed 
the ‘self-interested feelings of the planters’ even more than immediate abolition.44 Dundas’ 
suggestions never materialised into serious proposals. 
Henry Dundas’s parliamentary rhetoric, however, allowed him position in favour of 
abolition. In the same evening, he inserted the cataclysmic word ‘gradually’ in the proposed 
legislation that subsequently read: ‘the Slave Trade ought gradually to be abolished’.45 After 
an overnight debate, the House of Commons voted to defeat Robert Banks Jenkinson’s 
motion to adjourn (234 to 87), and Dundas’ amendment gained a majority (193 to 125). The 
gradual resolution was carried by 230 to 85 votes (a majority of 145) at around 6.00am on 3 
 
40 NRS, Papers of the Dundas Family, GD51/5/637/1: Letters, with enclosures, from James Stirling, Lord 
Provost, Edinburgh, to Henry Dundas, 7 March 1792. For wider context, see Whyte, Scotland and the Abolition 
of Black Slavery, 89, 93. 
41 The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-Trade, In the House of Commons on Monday the 
Second of April 1792, (n.d.), 1. 
42 Ibid., 28. 
43 Ibid., 97. 
44 Thomas Gisborne, The Principles of Moral Philosophy Investigated, and Applied to the Constitution of Civil 
Society. 4th Edition, to which is Added a New Edition, being the 5th, with an Appendix of Remarks on the Late 
Decision of the House of Commons Reflecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, (London, 1798), 425.  
45 The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-Trade, In the House of Commons on Monday the 
Second of April 1792, (n.d.), 127. 
 
April 1792.46 But no bill was yet passed. On 4 April, Wilberforce asked Dundas what he 
intended to do. The response came that it was not necessary for him to declare his intentions, 
and he challenged Wilberforce to proceed. Abolitionist MP Charles James Fox described 
Dundas’ compromise as a ‘disgrace to the House, and an insult to the country’, whose 
passage was now dependent upon colonial legislatures dominated by enslavers. Dundas 
reiterated their co-operation was ‘absolutely necessary to give effect to the mode of abolition 
which he conceived to be the most eligible’.47 The debate would resume in the House of 
Commons on 23 April. 
At a meeting on 5 April, the ‘London Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade’ 
thanked William Wilberforce, William Pitt and Charles James Fox. If Dundas really was 
widely praised for his work, as claimed by Michael Fry, it was not evident in this 
committee’s minutes.48 Instead, this committee resolved that the ‘gradual Abolition of the 
Slave Trade is not an adequate Remedy for its injustice and Cruelty; neither can it be deemed 
a compliance with the general wishes of the People’. Furthermore, ‘the interval in which the 
Slave [trade] shall be permitted to continue affords a prospect of redoubled Cruelties and 
Ravages on the Coast of Africa’.49 By 9 April, Wilberforce was privately scathing about 
Dundas: ‘nobody thinks well of him - duplicity and artifice are esteemed parts of his 
character’ although overall, ‘matters have turned out better than I expected, and I am thankful 
for what we have obtained’.50 With hindsight, Wilberforce would change his mind on the 
implications of gradualism. 
Imperial economics were central to Henry Dundas’ strategy. Eric Williams famously 
argued that abolition in 1807 and emancipation in 1834 became convenient as the West India 
economy was in decline after the American Revolution (1775-1783), whilst the actions of 
abolitionists were but a minor force.51 However, it is now almost universally accepted that the 
‘decline’ of the West India economy did not occur until the next century.52 Indeed, 1790-99 
was a boom time for the sugar trade and abolition in 1807 has been described as 
 
46 The Parliamentary History of England, vol. XXIX, March 1791-December 1792, (London, 1817), 1158. 
William Wilberforce gave the majority as 238 to 85. See R.I. Wilberforce, S. Wilberforce, The Life of 
Wilberforce, 2nd edition, Vol. 1, (London, 1839), 346. 
47 Parliamentary History of England, vol. XXIX, 1174-6. 
48 Fry, Dundas Despotism, 200. 
49 British Library, [BL] Proceedings of the Committee for Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1790-1819, Add. MS. 
21256, 5 April 1792, f. 54. 
50 R.I. Wilberforce, S. Wilberforce, Life of Wilberforce, Vol.1., 347. 
51 Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. 
52 Trevor Burnard, Jamaica in the Age of Revolution, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), 
231. 
 
‘econocide’.53 Biographer Michael Fry publicly claims the motives behind Dundas’ delay 
were indeed economic: ‘there was no point in having an economy which had previously been 
based on slavery collapse. That would have served nobody’s interests at all’.54 This phrasing 
acts as if African people did not exist and prioritises the interests of merchants and planters, 
some of whom were Dundas’ parliamentary allies. On 4 April 1792, Sir Adam Fergusson, 3rd 
Baronet of Kilkerran, the absentee owner of Rozelle Estate in St Thomas in the East, Jamaica 
from 1773 onwards, and MP for Ayrshire (1774-80; 1781-4; 1790-6) and Edinburgh (1784-
90),55 wrote to his manager on the island:   
The Resolution as pass[e]d is in general satisfactory; at least to all those, among 
whom I profess myself to be, and always to have been one, who think that, a 
reasonable equality between the sexes being established, a proper attention being 
given to the Relief and ease of Women with Child…there can be no reason to doubt 
that the numbers may be kept up among the Negroes in the West Indies as among 
any other Human Creatures on the globe.56  
 
Thus, Dundas’ close parliamentary ally immediately conveyed the news to Jamaica, where 
the principle of delaying abolition to increase the enslaved population was well-established. 
Fergusson later voted – as expected – against abolition. 
Gradualism was a transatlantic strategy and as it evolved, Stephen Fuller had an 
instrumental role. A West India merchant and agent for Jamaica in London, he was a member 
of the Sub Committee to oppose abolition.57 Fuller bridged the gap between colony and 
metropole, working with the Jamaica legislature. In 1788, the Jamaica Assembly held a series 
of investigations to ascertain the implications of potential abolition. With the island’s 
economy supposedly under threat, the assembly noted the enslaved population could not be 
sustained. Indeed, Fuller’s report of the investigation concluded that women comprised just 
under half of the island’s enslaved population of 250,000. According to Colleen A. 
Vasconcellos, Jamaica planters subsequently preferred Africa’s ‘breeding wenches’ rather 
than male enslaved people. The assembly resolutions noted that due to ‘disproportion 
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between the sexes’, abolition would prohibit the growth of the enslaved-labour force and 
ultimately decrease the value of the slavery-based economy. Moreover, the assembly 
simultaneously resolved, amongst other things, to pursue compensation from the British 
Parliament if trafficking was discontinued. Opposing any form of abolition, gradual or 
otherwise, the assembly effectively prioritised the importation of more enslaved women from 
Africa from 1788 onwards.58 Thus, the Jamaica Assembly’s Consolidated Slave Law that 
year intended to maintain rather than abolish chattel slavery.59 As early as November 1791, 
Fuller urged Dundas to ensure a speedy conclusion.60 
Stephen Fuller’s correspondence offers a transatlantic perspective on gradualism. On 
4 April 1792, he communicated the ‘unwelcome news’ to the Jamaican Committee of 
Correspondence that gradual abolition had been carried.61 Tallying up expenses for 1792, 
Fuller’s accounts revealed that, despite sending cards ‘to all our Friends in the H. of 
Commons’ to attend Mr Wilberforce’s motion of 2 April, ‘the word gradual [was] introduced 
by surprise’ which immediately necessitated the memorial to Dundas. This suggests the West 
India interest were neither privy to nor approved of Dundas’ solution of 2 April.62 Yet, 
Fuller’s correspondence to the Jamaica committee on 6 April underlines that whilst 
gradualism was initially viewed as a triumph for abolitionists, an opportunity arose: ‘Victory 
is not of quite so much consequence as it appeared to be at first sight, when the conquerors 
themselves know not what to do with it’.63 Srividhya Swaminathan’s position that Dundas’ 
insertion of ‘the term “gradual” as a qualifier of abolition’ was a ‘major victory’ for pro-
slavery forces is only partially accurate; it was not intended as a victory, but vested interests 
worked to ensure it became one.64  
Gradualism was not initially a joint strategy but that quickly changed. Henry Dundas 
does not seem to have been collaborating with the metropolitan West India interest before 2 
April 1792. He was not mentioned in that month’s minutes of the London West India 
Standing Committee, or the Sub Committee to oppose abolition, although a private strategy 
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simultaneously unfolded.65 On 7 April, George Hibbert, London West India merchant and 
Sub Committee member, replied to Simon Taylor, then still in the capital, acknowledging: ‘I 
am glad the negotiation is begun with Mr Dundas. I think it may be the means of escaping 
our entire destruction’.66 Recent research by Christer Petley and Katie Donington noted this 
negotiation with Petley claiming Dundas was seen as a ‘valuable ally’ by the West India 
interest.67 Thus, within a few days of gradualism entering the parliamentary record, Dundas 
was negotiating with the London based Jamaica interest to avoid what opponents of abolition 
described as their downfall.  
In the House of Commons on 23 April 1792, Henry Dundas showed his hand. 
Representing himself as morally opposed to the slave trade, he revealed he had ‘formed his 
opinion upon the propriety and justice’ of abolition from privy council evidence several years 
previously. The evidence informed his opinion that the slave trade ‘ought not be continued’ 
but neither did he think it would be ‘safe suddenly to put an end to it’. He argued that if it 
were immediately abolished it would continue through foreign countries, so abolitionists 
should ‘not to insist upon too short a period’ for the ‘sake of humanity’. He similarly warned 
the parliamentary West India interest that gradualism should not endure too long since the 
‘country had been already expressed upon the subject’.68 However, Dundas’ private 
negotiations with members of the Sub Committee to oppose abolition from 7 April 1792 - 
and given he never associated himself with the cause – undermines this benevolent self-
characterisation.  
On 23 April, Henry Dundas introduced a programme in the House of Commons with 
end dates for both the British and Foreign slave trade. He moved away a strategy of staggered 
emancipation and instead offered twelve resolutions to regulate trafficking: 1) the end of 
British involvement with the transatlantic slave trade on 1 January 1800, 2) the end to the 
slave trade from Africa, and inter-colonial trafficking between British colonies to foreign 
powers - almost half the traffic the previous year - from 1 May 1793, 3) No British ships, or 
ships from British colonies, to be involved with the transatlantic slave trade - unless they had 
previously been employed as such - from 1 May 1792, 4) from 1 May 1793, British ships 
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could not take a greater proportion of male than female Africans, 5) the maximum age of 
transported African people was 20 for males, and 16 for females, 6) Comprehensive 
regulation about departure points was to be introduced from 1 May 1792, enforced by 
customs officers in Great Britain and the colonies and guaranteed by financial sureties, 7) 
From 1797, financial duties were to be introduced for each imported slave, implemented by 
customs officers, which would generate income for colonial legislatures, 8) from 10 October 
1792, it was to be unlawful for any British merchants to import slaves to America, 9) from 1 
May 1793, the tonnage of ships leaving from London, Liverpool and Bristol for the coast of 
Africa was to be restricted 10) the British Parliament would indemnify any losses incurred by 
British merchants involved with the slave trade due to the preceding resolutions, 11) 
Exemplary punishments introduced for any British subject found guilty of mistreating 
Africans on ships or on the continent itself, and 12) King George III be addressed to gather 
support for negotiations to be opened with foreign powers for the ‘final and complete’ 
abolition of the trade (i.e. not just British involvement). ‘Accomplishing this important 
object’ was dependent upon ‘the prudence and wisdom of respective colonial legislatures’ 
and subject to their approval.69 The last resolution reiterated one impenetrable barrier to 
abolition and introduced another. Firstly, as discussed in detail below, the most influential 
colonial legislatures had no intention of countenancing amelioration for the enslaved, never 
mind abolition. Secondly, the last resolution implies King George III would support complete 
abolition, yet he privately supported the pro-slavery cause.70 
William Pitt perceptively noted that Dundas’ proposals could be offered under a 
programme of immediate abolition.71 William Wilberforce gave credit to Dundas but 
remained committed to immediatism. Charles James Fox went further, registering his disgust 
that Dundas endorsed the trafficking of women and children to promote the increase of the 
enslaved population. Secondly, he argued Dundas had ‘gone much too far’ on the question of 
compensation and accused him of introducing the concept of gradualism then devising 
propositions to effect it. Dundas responded it was the other way around: his opinions on 
abolition were formed three years ago from the privy council, the arguments came first, then 
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the propositions.72 If the secret negotiations with the West India interest around 7 April 1792 
were made public, the parliamentary abolitionists would have been more sceptical. As 
Katherine Paugh describes, gradualism allowed ‘planters and their allies to claim the mantle 
of abolitionism whilst postponing the end of the Atlantic slave trade indefinitely with 
schemes for promoting fertility among Afro-Caribbeans’.73  
How to assess Henry Dundas’ ambitious programme of regulation and reform on 23 
April? If implemented, these would have ended British trafficking in enslaved people in 
1800, seven years earlier than it was abolished. However, on both 2 and 23 April, Dundas 
stated that colonial enslavers should have a voice in the abolition debate. The pillars of 
Dundas’ gradualism were consistent with the Jamaica Assembly’s resolutions in 1788 and the 
West India interest petition of March 1792. Dundas’ proposals on 2 April allowed for the 
continuation of trafficking to allow ‘natural increase’, whilst it evolved on 23 April to 
promote the importation of enslaved women, especially children under the age of 16, and 
ratified the principle of compensation. It is only possible to view them as a path to abolition if 
it is accepted colonial assemblies would have agreed, and these were dominated by planters 
who would never have conceded. 
The question is: what choice did Dundas, and by extension the government, have? In 
the aftermath of the American Revolution, the dynamic in colonial governance altered with 
power shifting from colonial assemblies to Parliament. D.J. Murray attributed this to the anti-
slavery movement, citing new forms of Crown colony governance (e.g., Trinidad, 1797) as 
well as abolition (1807) and emancipation (1834). Buckley notes this process began with the 
establishment of West India regiments in 1795.74 In an era in which the initiative was shifting 
towards the government, Dundas reiterated the rights of assemblies (on the question of 
prolonging the slave trade), but his strategies in matters of colonial security infringed upon 
their perceived rights when required (with West India regiments). In other words, if abolition 
had aligned with imperial interests, he, and the government, would have supported it in the 
mid-to-late-1790s. As it happens, immediate abolition threatened colonial security, partially 
explaining Dundas’ opposition. 
Henry Dundas’ 12-point resolutions were never implemented. On 27 April, resolution 
1 was submitted to the committee. The next day Sir E. Knatchbull’s amendment moved the 
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terminal date from 1 January 1800 (as intended by Dundas) to 1 January 1796.75 In response, 
Dundas withdrew from proceedings. Bishop Porteus recorded Dundas’ private view that the 
‘W.I. Planters & Merchants would have acquiesced in the Annihilation of the Trade in the 
year 1800’.76 This statement – if accurate - suggests Dundas’ inability to implement a 
schedule pre-agreed with parliamentary West Indians was behind his withdrawal. David 
Brion Davis reasoned the shortened period offered less time for planters to stock their estates 
and less scope for colonial legislatures to further delay abolition.77 Ultimately, it was not 
Dundas’ proposals that went forward. William Pitt was a long-term opponent of 
indemnifying slave-traders and modified the bill - removing all references to compensation – 
which passed the lower house and went to the House for Lords for scrutiny.78 Dundas’ 
activities still attracted public support from those opposed to immediate abolition. David 
Evans of Lambeth wrote applauding his prevention of ‘many thousands of respectable 
subjects [falling] into certain ruin! From which you alone have respited them’.79  
The motives of some in the House of the Lords were more transparent. On 3 May 
1792, the modified resolutions relative to abolition were considered. Viscount Stormont 
immediately called for more evidence, whilst the Duke of Clarence, son of King George III 
and later William IV, argued it ‘ought not be abolished at all’ due, amongst other reasons, to 
the ‘great property’ and ‘immense commerce’ connected with the trade. As Richard Pares 
noted, the Lords disliked ‘all change’ and in this case abolition was opposed by the Royal 
family itself. On 8 May, Stormont proposed an investigation (with witnesses under oath) into 
the African trafficking, the sugar trade and West Indies more broadly. Stormont’s motion 
carried by 63 to 36 and an investigation via a Committee of the whole House was 
established.80 This was the opportunity the West India interest had been waiting on. The 
nature of the strategy to delay abolition was laid out in a private set of instructions - undated, 
but around early May 1792 - Stephen Fuller sent to barristers Edward Law, Robert Dallas and 
the attorney-general for Jamaica, Robert Sewell: 
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Mr F[uller] would advise a descant upon the fatal dangerous word Gradual. The 
proposer [Henry Dundas] knew not what he meant by it, nor the extent, nor the 
consequences of it. And those that voted for it, voted more from curiosity than any 
other motive – viz. – to see what was meant by it. Immediate Abolition would not 
have been carried – Gradual more dangerous to the Colonies.81 
 
Thus, according to Fuller, immediate abolition would never have carried but gradualism 
established an important precedent. At the same time, the House of Lords investigation was 
the first step in the long, tedious playing out of the inevitable. Before the Bar of the House of 
Lords on 14 May 1792, Edward Law, counsel for the West India Planters and Merchants, 
eloquently laid out the case against abolition, echoing many of the points advised in Fuller’s 
instructions.82 Evidence was taken from witnesses – including Simon Taylor – over six days 
before the session ground to a halt on 5 June. There was no vote taken on Pitt’s resolution 
and the momentum was lost when it was delayed into the next session. It was the House of 
Lords that extinguished abolition in 1792.  
Was there an alternative in 1792? Contemporaries and historians are divided. Bishop 
Porteus argued that Wilberforce should have moved for his own version in April 1791: ‘my 
own opinion is that it would have been better to have moved for a gradual abolition at first. 
But greater & Wiser Men thought otherwise’.83 This approach would have allowed 
Wilberforce to define a fixed term and draw in undecideds. Echoing this, and based upon the 
consistent numbers of voters who supported abolition in April 1791 (88), who voted to 
adjourn on 2-3 April 1792 (87), and those who voted against gradual abolition on the same 
date (85), Judith Jennings endorsed James Walvin’s position that a better Parliamentary 
manager than Wilberforce would have attracted moderate voters and as a result abolition 
could have passed as soon as 1793.84 On the other hand, Stephen Fuller discussed with the 
Jamaica Committee of Correspondence what gradual abolition meant for the pro-slave-trade 
lobby. Deciding on 2 May 1792 that the West India interest now ‘had no chance’ of 
preventing abolition, the agent reckoned that without Dundas’ intervention, MPs sympathetic 
to the West India cause would have prevailed: ‘I am perswaded that if it had not been for Mr 
Dundas’ amendment by adding the fatal word gradual, we should have had a majority in the 
House of Commons’.85 Wilberforce also agreed that immediate abolition would not have 
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passed in April 1792: ‘We found there was no chance of getting any Bill through the 
Lords’.86 The irresistible conclusion is the insertion of gradual into the parliamentary record 
was an important precondition for abolition itself. Nevertheless, whilst it set a precedent, it 
provided scope for years of delay. Indeed, since ‘gradual abolition’ subsequently meant 
blocking Wilberforce’s attempts at parliamentary motions rather than passing any legislation, 
the term is a historiographical misnomer. 
By late 1792, parliamentary opposition to abolition had consolidated in the aftermath 
of the French Revolution and rising anti-Jacobinism. The abolitionists’ petition campaign was 
viewed suspiciously as a cover for unpatriotic subversion.87 On 11 February 1793, King 
George III declared war on France, whilst William Pitt banned seditious meetings and 
publications the previous year. Abolitionists became associated with reform politics, and the 
movement became discredited by perceived connections to Revolutionary France. Even 
though international affairs had made the prospect of abolition less likely and with the Lords’ 
investigation seemingly in stasis, Wilberforce again attempted to renew his campaign in the 
1792-3 session. With opponents of abolition in the administration and declining support 
amongst allies, proposing the abolition of trafficking to foreign colonies represented the most 
realistic prospect of success. However, the parliamentary West India interest were organised 
enough to defeat it.88 By 7 February 1794, Wilberforce again re-introduced the resolution to 
suppress trafficking to foreign ports. By this point, Dundas openly admitted in a letter to 
Wilberforce he was practically opposed to abolition:  
I do not dispute that a great deal of very good reasoning can be offered on the 
principles you state; but I know with absolute certainty that the Bill will be 
considered by the colonies as an encroachment upon their legislative rights, and they 
will not submit to it unless compelled. Upon this ground I have used all the influence 
I possess to prevent any question on the subject being agitated, at least during the 
war. My opinion does not prevail, and therefore the only thing to which I can 
reconcile myself is being perfectly quiet on the subject; and even to that I should feel 
it very difficult to reconcile myself, if I did not believe that your Bill will not pass the 
House of Lords.89 
 
In Dundas’ own words, he used all his influence to prevent abolition being raised. However, 
the enemies of abolition in the Commons could not, in wartime, seriously argue for the 
continuation of trafficking to foreign powers. Wilberforce’s bill passed by a vote of 56-38 in 
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the lower house. Nevertheless, Dundas’ prediction that the House of Lords would not 
countenance any abolition was proven accurate. According to Porter, most peers were 
opposed to a partial abolition whilst the big question remained unresolved even if that meant 
supplying enemy powers.90 
On 26 February 1795, William Wilberforce again introduced a motion calling for the 
House of Commons to conclude their own resolution (of April 1792) which meant abolition 
on 1 January 1796. During this debate, Henry Dundas explained why he had adopted a 
‘middle line’: abolition ‘required time in order to effect it completely and without injury to 
those persons whose property was embarked to a large amount’. He admitted he was 
‘extremely concerned’ abolition would have occurred four-years earlier than he intended. In 
doing so, Dundas effectively confirmed why he had withdrawn from the April 1792 
proceedings. Indeed, abolition in 1796 instead of 1800 would not have provided ‘sufficient 
time for merchants and planters to arrange their affairs, so as not to be injured by the event’. 
Dundas argued delay was required to enable planters to import ‘such a number of slaves as 
would be necessary as to their future population’. He confessed he did not have the ‘courage 
to agree to the abolition’ and although ‘no man could doubt’ the propriety of the cause, it 
must be done gradually - over an undefined period - so it would not have severe 
consequences. William Pitt, whose friendship with Wilberforce had suffered due to the 
relentless abolition bills, nevertheless came out in support. Sir William Young, an absentee 
Tobago planter, claimed only the colonists could approve abolition, and since they had 
supposedly implemented ameliorative measures it would no longer be required. The motion 
for abolition in 1795 was adjourned (78-61).91 George Canning suggested Dundas voted 
against abolition: ‘of leaders, you know, Pitt is one way and Dundas the other’.92 
The pseudonymous ‘Howard’ (likely an abolitionist) publicly accused Henry Dundas 
of working with the West India interest in the House of Commons in February 1795: 
While then you stand forward, fighting the battles of an unfeeling tribe of merchants, 
who would sell and buy their God, as they do his creatures, to increase their incomes, 
and to provide for the luxuries of their table - you must be convinced, that your heart, 
if it be in the bosom of a human being, and not of a monster, must execrate and abhor 
the cause which you espouse.93 
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‘Howard’ compared Dundas to noted anti-slavery politician, Charles James Fox: ‘Think how 
odious you must appear by contrast! – the one, the defender of the vilest institution of human 
enormity - the other, the eloquent asserter of the RIGHTS OF ALL! ...Mr Dundas, the 
disguised oppressor of the human species!’.94 Whilst polemic in nature, Howard’s accusation 
is corroborated in Fuller’s correspondence. On 4 March 1795, Fuller reported the successful 
delaying of Wilberforce’s motion to the Jamaican Committee of Correspondence: ‘Mr 
Dundas was absolutely & positively with us; which tends still further to convince me, that his 
former motion for a gradual abolition, was a sudden thought & had never undergone his 
serious consideration’.95 Henry Dundas placated the West India interest in more direct ways. 
The Fedon uprising of March 1795 decimated the island of Grenada in the southeast 
Caribbean. The island’s merchants petitioned Parliament for relief and the British 
Government provided £1.5m in loans of which approximately one-third went to firms 
operated by Scots.96 These loans kickstarted the slave economy, and Dundas was described 
by claimants as the ‘promoter and supporter of the bailout’.97 In August 1795, Glasgow firm 
Alexander Houston & Co. – William McDowall, MP for Glasgow Burghs, was a co-partner - 
solicited support from Dundas, who acted as guarantor for some of their loans.98 Thus, Henry 
Dundas’ strategy to delay abolition was implemented in close alignment with the West India 
interest in a quid pro quo relationship that advanced imperial concerns and attracted public 
critique.  
What of Dundas’ motives? Historian Ryan Hanley described his anti-abolition stance 
in 1795 as ‘politically canny’ - from Dundas’ perspective - as it placated the West India 
interest in Parliament and maintained support for the campaign to recapture Saint 
Domingue.99 Roger Buckley argues Pitt and Dundas ensured the continuation of trafficking 
as the government depended upon African enslaved labour to support military operations in 
the West Indies. In early 1795, both supporters and opponents of abolition in the cabinet 
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agreed to use enslaved labourers in West India regiments, despite opposition from resident 
planters. Between 1795 and 1808, around 13,400 enslaved people were purchased for 
regiments (almost 4 percent of all those transported in British ships to the British Caribbean 
across that period).100 Earl Grey estimated the size of force required to defend the British 
Leeward and Windward islands was 11,500, and it is no exaggeration to state that enslaved 
recruits secured the British West Indies at a time of grave danger.101 As Buckley noted, 
Dundas, and others, participated ‘in all stages of the development and implementation of the 
policy of purchasing slaves as recruits for the British army’ as the government became the 
‘largest individual buyer of slaves and, consequently, the major promoter of the wretched 
trade’. Furthermore, Dundas explicitly blocked the ‘universal practice’ of emancipating 
slaves after military service because, in his own words, ‘the great alarm it would excite 
amongst the planters’.102 As Secretary of State for War, Dundas led a strategy dependent 
upon the acquisition of enslaved people to strengthen the government’s war effort. His 
motivations in delaying abolition after 1793 were grounded in imperial defence: the delay 
prolonged the trafficking in enslaved people which improved the military capability of the 
British army. The broader purpose was the prosecution of war against revolutionary, 
antislavery France, in which Britain took the side of slavery.  
William Wilberforce introduced another motion for immediate abolition on 18 
February 1796, arguing the House of Commons had already ratified the move. That same 
day, Dundas abruptly cut short a letter to Lord Courtown – James George Stopford, MP for 
Great Bedwyn – and revealed: ‘I must go to oppose the propositi-on for the abolition of the 
slave trade’.103 After various contributions, Dundas spoke: he opposed abolition as it would 
‘endanger the peace of the country’. He cited the wars with the French, especially in the West 
Indies. A motion was introduced to delay, but ultimately leave was given to bring in an 
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abolition bill which passed with a majority (93 for to 67 against).104 General Tarleton 
introduced the bill for its second reading on 3 March – an attempt to quash it with few 
abolitionists present in the chamber - although Wilberforce managed to thwart the ploy and it 
was carried by 64 to 31. On 7 March, the bill was sent to committee by a vote of 76-31.105  
Any abolitionist success, however, had to overcome a consolidated West India 
interest and Henry Dundas in the House of Commons. Ostensibly playing the middle-ground 
on 15 March 1796, Dundas acknowledged ‘injustice and inhumanity’ but argued it was not 
the ‘proper time for the abolition’. However, in the anti-abolition manifesto that followed 
Dundas effectively became the voice of the West India interest. Firstly, and consistent with 
his previous public utterances, Dundas argued the ‘cordial cooperation’ of the West India 
planters was required for abolition. Secondly, since trafficking from Africa would supposedly 
continue afterwards amongst nations that did not ‘carry it on with so much mildness as we 
did’, he was opposed to unilateral British abolition. Thirdly, he defended the West India 
planters as a ‘respectable body of men’ and reiterated claims for compensation. Fourthly, he 
underlined the commercial value of the revenues from the West India trades, as well as their 
strategic importance to the empire. Finally, Dundas reiterated trafficking should be regulated 
to people aged under twenty, and abolition delayed indefinitely ‘to give the planters only a 
little longer time would be doing no good to them, but much injury to the country’.106 With 
such persuasive arguments from the then Secretary of State for War, support in the lower 
House was perhaps less than expected. The bill was defeated at the third reading by the 
narrowest of margins: 74-70.107  
How can Henry Dundas’s actions in this episode be explained? Inexplicably, Michael 
Fry’s Dundas Despotism is silent on these events in 1796 – even though Anstey’s text is cited 
in the bibliography – instead accepting Dundas’ parliamentary contributions in April 1792 at 
face value and taking a positive view. By ignoring Dundas’ subsequent collaboration with the 
West India interest and practical anti-abolitionism, Fry’s grave error of omission is the 
foundation upon which the representation of Dundas as a ‘genuine opponent of the slave 
trade’ rests.108 Instead, there is compelling evidence Dundas helped to ensure its continuation. 
Indeed, Anstey levels two charges against him in 1796; his persuasive oratory on the political 
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and economic importance of West Indies compelled others to vote against the bill, and 
secondly, as a Government election agent he mobilised Scottish votes.109 Two records of 
votes on abolition bills in the House of Common in the 1790s exist: a partial list of 
abolitionists in 1791, and the list of voters (both for and against) on 15 March 1796.110 There 
is no written evidence Dundas voted for or against abolition on either date. However, when 
voting is tight like in March 1796, the effect of abstaining is not dissimilar as a vote against. 
According to the print press (see below), Dundas’ oratory also influenced the vote although 
some of the 74 required little encouragement. Whilst it is estimated sixty-three MPs had West 
India connections in the House of Common in 1796, only twenty-three have been identified 
amongst the 74 who voted against abolition on 15 March.111 Some of the remainder had 
colonial connections, including 10 to 14 with interests in the East Indies, which for Anstey, 
would have compelled them to resist any perceived attack on imperial order.112  
Almost no MPs from Scotland deviated from the Scottish manager Dundas’ 
committed anti- abolitionist stance. As G.M. Ditchfield notes it was ‘largely due to Dundas 
that only one Scottish member - as far as is known - voted for abolition in 1791 or 1796’.113 
In the vote of 15 March 1796, Anstey identified that eleven MPs within the group of 74 were 
closely associated with Dundas, including his son Robert S. Dundas, MP for Hastings. Only 
one, Robert Barclay Allardice was a ‘West India’ MP. Henry Dundas, therefore, likely 
mobilised at least ten extra anti-abolition votes.114 However, Anstey underestimated the 
strength of the Dundas phalanx. Twelve Scottish MPs are listed as voting against abolition 
(including Sir Adam Fergusson), although Anstey only records nine. In fact, all twelve 
Scottish parliamentarians – also including Patrick Heron, John Callander and Duncan 
Davidson – were aligned with Dundas, making a total of thirteen MPs supporting his 
position.115 On 15 March 1796, Dundas had the support of West India interest MPs and the 
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Scottish phalanx who were able to defeat even a full strength group of committed 
abolitionists (30).116 Add in colonial MPs and undecideds persuaded by Dundas’ oratory, this 
well-drilled group was more than a match for the loosely organised supporters of abolition. 
As Wilberforce famously quoted, ten or twelve MPs who had previously offered support 
were absent in country estates or at the opera. Whilst the abolition cause might have 
succeeded with better management, there is no question who contemporaries blamed. Anglo-
Irish parliamentarian and abolitionist ally, William De Burgh, wrote to Wilberforce on 15 
March: ‘against Dundas, I recommend, and will cultivate in myself, a propensity to direct 
hostilities’.117  
The West India interest were universal in their public approbation for Henry Dundas, 
whose actions were popularly perceived to have influenced voting. On 31 March 1796, the 
True Briton announced West India merchants were so enamoured with Dundas’ ‘admirable 
speech’, which ‘clearly influenced the decision of the House’, it was to be published so it 
might be ‘disseminated through the Country’.118 John Petrie, agent for Tobago in London, 
forwarded an address to Dundas to which he added his ‘vote of thanks and to entreat that you 
will persevere in your endeavours to protect property and oppose the wild schemes of 
visionary reformers’. Tobago’s enslavers were convinced abolition would have passed 
without Dundas’s ‘well-timed, sensible and animated conduct’.119 William Craig Harbone, a 
slaver of some thirty-years’ experience, wrote in March to congratulate him ‘on the success 
you experienced in defeating that Quixote scheme of abolition’, noting he’d never heard more 
‘sounder reasoning’ than in his parliamentary speeches.120 However, with such a small 
majority, moderates realised a more subtle phase of gradual abolition was required. The 
House of Lords could not directly block again and so it fell to MPs to ensure continuation.  
On 22 March 1796, the Society of West India Planters and Merchants passed a vote of 
thanks for Henry Dundas’ ‘able and constitutional speech’ and for the ‘effectual opposition 
he thereby gave to the Bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade’. The committee also asked 
Dundas to send them the ‘outlines of his plans for the future regulation of the Slave Trade’.121 
These minutes and request were sent to Dundas by Robert Milligan, a Scottish enslaver in 
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London.122 Milligan revealed the basic principles of Dundas’ propositions on 15 March met 
with their approval: ‘I have now no doubts of their coming forward in a proper manner in 
support’.123 This was a key moment: the West India interest endorsed Dundas’ gradualism as 
a joint strategy after March 1796. Any notion of neutrality in the supposed fixer was over. 
Robert Taylor conveyed the good news to Simon Taylor in Kingston, outlining Dundas’ role 
and endorsing his authenticity: ‘Mr Dundas has justly merited his thanks of the W.I. Interest, 
for his very able speech upon the occasion, and I really believe him sincere in the opinion he 
delivered’.124 Before he left Government in 1801, the sincerity of Dundas’ gradual abolition 
was tested. He was not always a committed ally of planters - purchasing Africans for West 
India Regiments in Jamaica attracted opposition - but he publicly championed the rights of 
colonial assemblies and combined with the metropolitan West India interest when agendas 
aligned. In April 1796, Dundas joined with West India MPs to oppose a bill introduced by 
Peter Francis in the House of Commons which sought to increase the enslaved population - 
this was opposed due to the perceived infringement on colonial affairs.125 Francis publicly 
rebuked Dundas, noting the shift in position from 2 April 1792, when ‘from that moment and 
from that station, in my judgement, he has done nothing but descend’. Indifferent about 
personal reputation, Dundas confirmed ‘unless we had the concurrence of the colonies 
themselves, all that we could do in the way of internal regulation was not worth a straw’.126  
Henry Dundas claimed to be a moral opponent of slavery in theory, whilst allying 
with the parliamentary West India interest to delay abolition in practice. On 6 April 1797, 
absentee Jamaica planter Charles Ellis introduced a motion in the House of Commons 
supposedly intended to end the slave trade. The amelioration of conditions, including 
improvements in religious provision, labour and food supplies, was proposed.127 In the spirit 
of the collaboration revealed in the Milligan correspondence, William Young and Charles 
Ellis submitted the motion to Dundas for ‘his consideration’.128 William Wilberforce and 
Charles James Fox opposed in the lower house, but it quickly passed both. Abolitionists had 
every right to be suspicious. Ellis’ motion was informed by a secret report of December 1796, 
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based on communications with planters in St Vincent and the parliamentary West India 
interest. These communications approved several conclusions, including a strategy:  
For the joint purposes of opposing the plan of Mr Wilberforce, and establishing the 
character of West India Body, it is essential that they should manifest their 
willingness to promote actively the cause of Humanity by such steps as shall be 
consistent with…the general interest of the colonies.129  
 
This was a West India ploy – in discussion with Dundas, disguised as an ameliorative 
strategy - to stave off full abolition for as long as possible. Wilberforce understood the 
duplicity of the ‘abominable motion’ in a letter of February 1797 to Thomas Babington: 
‘[colonial assemblies] must at least appear to act, if they would be safe from the interference 
of the British parliament’.130 In the House of Commons on 6 April, Dundas approved this 
version of gradual abolition proposed by enslavers as it ‘afforded him an opportunity of 
agreeing to a final abolition’ with colonial assemblies. Fox instantly saw through the charade 
which was intended to ‘perpetuate the slave trade…the support to it given by Mr Dundas, was 
proof to him of its object, as that gentleman had always opposed the abolition’.131 For Dale 
H. Porter, the Ellis address discouraged proposed abolitionist legislation up to 1804 (though 
Wilberforce attempted in 1797, 1798, 1799 and 1802).132 Wilberforce’s diary reveals the 
practicalities of delay. In February 1800, he was deterred from entering a motion as the ‘West 
Indians talked of a compromise’, which entailed a five-to-seven-year suspension of the 
trafficking of African people. However, Pitt ‘listened too easily’ to the West India 
proprietors, who initially suggested they were willing to support but backtracked at a meeting 
during which a ‘strong anti-abolition spirit was manifested’. Even without the approval of 
enslavers, Wilberforce hoped Pitt would still come forward but expected nothing from 
Dundas:  
I wished Pitt to come forward with the measure notwithstanding, and tried to prevail 
on Dundas to support us in it. But the latter, though extremely angry at the Jamaica 
people, who, in a report recently come over, talk big and dispute our right to abolish, 
&c. will not, I fear, consent to support us now.133 
 
Dundas was therefore presented with the opportunity to fulfil his earlier proposal of fixed 
term abolition (on 1 January 1800), but his collaboration with the West Indians meant no 
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parliamentary motion could ensue. Devolving responsibility for the reform of slavery to 
enslavers was the most insidiously effective way of delaying abolition up to 1804.   
To progress the ameliorative strategy in 1797, the Duke of Portland, leading opponent 
of abolition and then Colonial Secretary, was given responsibility in the House of Lords to 
officially communicate with West India councils and assemblies.134 Responses to the 
Portland communications from colonial legislatures allow the prospects of success to be 
measured. No ameliorative policies were implemented in an eight-year-period. In October 
1804, Lord Camden wrote to colonial Governors to ascertain progress, if any. Jamaica and 
the Bahamas did not respond, whilst Dominica did not provide adequate information. The 
Leeward islands, Grenada and St Vincent outlined the difficulty in implementing such 
policies. Only Barbados had attempted token ameliorative legislation by that point.135 The 
latter colony provides a case study of gradual abolition in colonial form. In 1800, Lord 
Seaforth – a Scottish MP, aligned with Dundas from 1793 – was appointed by the Duke of 
Portland as the Governor of Barbados. Although the author of a recent Seaforth biography 
misinterpreted the cynical nature of gradual abolition, the work reveals how Governor 
Seaforth - who simultaneously became an enslaver in Berbice - attempted to implement 
ameliorative policies in the Barbados Assembly at the behest of the government. Seaforth’s 
introduction of the ‘Slaves Protection Bill’ in July 1801 brought him into conflict with the 
island’s planters. This bill passed eventually in May 1805, although the failure of colonial 
assemblies without a Portland placeman to pass legislation is more representative of futile 
Government policy.136 Thus, metropolitan defenders of the slave trade combined with 
Portland and Dundas to implement a strategy to provide plantation slavery with a more 
acceptable profile in order to delay full abolition – having accepted amelioration as a lesser 
evil - yet even this was resisted by colonial legislatures.  
The viability of Dundas’ gradual abolition can be measured by posing one simple 
question: would colonial legislatures ever have acquiesced? Given that amelioration proved 
impossible, the abolitionist parliamentarians were sceptical. Charles James Fox noted on 15 
March 1796 that if the consent of the planters was required, ‘what ground of hope have we, 
even from their professions, that they will ever be induced to give their consent to such a 
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measure?’.137 As late as 1806, abolitionist MP Sir Samuel Romilly noted in the House of 
Commons ‘whenever we have expressed a desire to abolish the Slave Trade, the aim of the 
Colonies has been to disappoint us in the attainment of that object’.138 There is ample 
evidence to support Romilly’s position. The 1796 address from Tobago colonists to Dundas 
warned abolition would lead to the ‘inevitable ruin’ of the West Indies and cautioned against 
the arbitrary sacrifice of a ‘useful set of men to gratify the Mistaken Philanthropy’.139 In 
response to the Portland enquiries from 1797 – although these responses were not known 
until 1804 - the Jamaica Assembly underlined the ‘right of obtaining labourers from Africa is 
secured to your Majesty’s faithful Subjects in this Colony by several British Acts of 
Parliament’ and that ‘under the most solemn promises of this (absolutely necessary) 
assistance, and they can never give up’. The same body reiterated this position in 1800, 
casting doubt on ‘any act that may render this essential right doubtful’. In 1798, the General 
Council of the Leeward Islands also noted: 
We conceive that the West India islands never could have been, nor ever can be, 
cultivated to effect, without the right, of which we trust no power will endeavour to 
deprive us, of obtaining labourers from Africa.140 
 
Similarly, members of the General Assembly of Barbados warned in October 1801 against 
Seaforth’s ‘interference between the white inhabitants of the island and their slaves’.141 Thus, 
as expected, the most powerful island assemblies in the late-eighteenth-century British West 
Indies were unequivocally opposed to both amelioration and abolition, gradual or otherwise. 
Dundas’ proposals – dependent upon the co-operation of enslavers from the outset – would 
never have been approved by colonial legislatures. Given his long term private and 
professional collaboration with the West India interest, as well the correspondence he 
received from colonists, he was aware of this. As Michael Taylor recently noted, delegating 
the reform of slavery to colonial assemblies, even as late as the 1820s, ‘in practice, meant 
nothing would be done’.142 In his own words, by providing enslavers with a veto Dundas’ 
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strategy prolonged the transatlantic slave trade which facilitated an increase of the enslaved 
population. And, from his point of view, it was successful in doing so. 
Yet, William Wilberforce offered redemption. Henry Dundas was out of Government 
in 1801 but remained an MP - taking a ‘leading role’ in the government’s election in the 
summer of 1802 – and, after being raised to a peerage as Viscount Melville that December, 
slowly drifted out of political life. Henry Addington, Prime Minister (1801-4) dispensed with 
Dundas as Scottish manager in June 1803. Dundas returned to Government with the second 
Pitt Ministry on 10 May 1804, taking office as First Lord of the Admiralty.143 On 13 June, 
Wilberforce directly appealed to Dundas to negotiate with the West India interest to effect 
abolition. Whilst noting the ‘friendly regard’ they still held each other in, Wilberforce 
lamented ‘it has long been matter of great pain to me that in the grand object of my 
Parliamentary existence you should have been the person to oppose & defeat my wishes’. He 
gave Dundas the benefit of the doubt: 
I am sure my dear Lordship, you must yourself be sensible that the West Indians 
have greatly mistaken your real meaning & while they ought to have considered you 
as only wishing to prevent their sufferings from a sudden change, they have on the 
contrary conceiv’d you to have been defending the present system as meaning that it 
should continue forever.144 
 
Wilberforce’s abolition bill was introduced on 30 May 1804 and passed through three 
readings in the Commons up to 25 June. Pitt revealed to Wilberforce that the Cabinet – of 
which Dundas was part - agreed ‘the subject to be hung up till next year’.145 The next bill of 
February 1805 was defeated at a second reading (77-70). Wilberforce commented on the 
vote: ‘some Scotch I believe, who last year neutral, voted against us’ which Anstey attributes 
to Dundas.146 If this really was his doing, it was his last act in delaying abolition. He was 
impeached on 8 April 1805 and although acquitted the next year, his career in the House of 
Commons was over.147 The Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was given Royal Assent 
on 25 March 1807 and passed into the statute books on 1 May.   
Prominent abolitionists had a low opinion of Henry Dundas, some barely rising above 
contempt. In 1808, leading abolitionist Thomas Clarkson described gradual abolitionists as 
the ‘most dangerous enemies of our cause’, naming Jenkinson (Lord Hawkesbury), 
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Addington (Lord Sidmouth) and Dundas (Lord Melville).148 When looking back on earlier 
events in 1823, Wilberforce described Dundas as the ‘avowed advocate of the colonies’.149 
He also understood gradualism had been an underhand tactic: 
Our opponents, except a very few, who were directly interested by their property or 
political connexion with certain towns, professed to concur with us in design, but to 
adopt a more moderate, and as they contended more effectual, method of 
accomplishing our common purpose; so that many who could not avowedly oppose 
us became our most dangerous enemies.150 
 
In the same passage, the editors of Wilberforce’s diaries, his two sons, represented Dundas as 
the chief enemy of abolition. The ‘apparent honesty and warmth of heart which marked his 
[Dundas’] speeches, enabled him to turn aside what he knew well how to represent as a false 
and sickly humanity. Oppression could not find a kinder advocate, or abuses a more honest 
patron’.151 The abolitionist view of Dundas was unambiguous: he was the main barrier to 
their aims and his successful strategies meant no abolition whilst he retained influence. 
Presciently, in the parliamentary debate of 15 March 1796, Henry Dundas noted that 
‘the world must decide upon the conduct of those who took different sides upon this great 
question’.152 On the one hand, the introduction of ‘gradual’ on 2-3 April 1792 set an 
important precedent for full abolition. On the other hand, Dundas’ private and public 
activities described here illustrate an instrumental role in delaying abolition afterwards. These 
two claims are not mutually exclusive and his role in the former cannot be separated from the 
latter. When the evidence is considered in its entirety, the characterisation of Dundas as a 
genuine opponent of the slave trade is simply not sustainable as an historically informed 
position. He wielded significant political power and influence in the House of Commons, and 
was instrumental to the delay of abolition in order to protect British economic, imperial, 
strategic and military interests. This necessarily involved the continuation of private 
enterprise in the transatlantic slave economy - slavers, merchants, planters – and Dundas 
collaborated with their representatives when required to effect joint aims.  
Historians have tended to consider the sincerity of Henry Dundas’ introduction of the 
principle of gradual abolition but the focus should really be on his actions within the era. 
Dundas may have been sincere about gradual abolition on 2-3 April 1792. Indeed, if Stephen 
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Fuller is to be believed, the West India interest did not initially approve. But whether Dundas 
was initially sincere in theory is irrelevant: his strategies were always qualified. In a time of 
growing public support for abolition, Dundas never presented an unrestricted path to effect it 
at any point. His proposals were always dependent upon the co-operation of West India 
enslavers and he reiterated the rights of colonial legislatures time and again, during an era 
when the power gradually moved to the British government. As Fox and others vocalised at 
the time, Dundas’ proposals were not an abolition for the anti-slavery movement rather he 
designed a gradual abolition to suit the needs of enslavers and the British state. This was 
classic Dundas: a middle-ground solution cloaked in humanity to suit government and 
propertied interests whilst making it appear it was for all parties, though none fully approved. 
This article goes further than the Anstey-Davis interpretation: from 7 April 1792, 
Dundas sometimes worked with the West India body in general, and the metropolitan 
Jamaica interest in particular: all combined in Parliament to ensure the continuation of the 
slave trade longer than it might have. Dundas’ stance was reinforced with imperial events and 
he was anti-abolition in practice until his political career ended. The opening of war with 
Revolutionary France in February 1793 and the French Republic’s abolition of the slave trade 
in 1794 provided the British Government with an opportunity to bolster military capability 
via enslaved West India regiments. From December 1796, Dundas worked in tandem with the 
parliamentary West India interest – led by absentee Jamaica planter Charles Ellis - to provide 
plantation slavery with a more acceptable profile with the aim of staving off abolition. The 
former policy was unsuccessful, the latter was successful to an extent. It was certainly a 
useful collaboration for the powerful Jamaica body: between 1793 and 1808, over a third of 
the African enslaved people trafficked on British ships were shipped to just one island. 
Jamaica was the leading recipient of enslaved people under Dundas’ delay.153 
How to quantify Dundas’ delay? It is a matter of the historical record that his insertion 
of gradual delayed the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade from 1792 until 1807. All that 
remains is a hypothetical discussion about how long his strategies prolonged the trafficking. 
Regardless of Dundas’s motives in April 1792, it seems unlikely that immediate abolition 
would have passed in any case. The West India interest were confident of victory in the 
House of Commons, and Wilberforce privately accepted his plans had no chance of passing 
the House of Lords. Yet, after the outbreak of war in February 1793, Dundas used his 
 
153 Around 217,145 African enslaved people were shipped to Jamaica between 1793 and 1808, 37 percent of the 
overall British total of 583,348. See The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, Available: 
http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates Accessed: 10 February 2020. 
 
influence - notably in March 1796 - to delay indefinitely. Dundas’ power was on the wane 
after being deposed as Scottish manager by Addington in 1803, and Wilberforce claimed 
Scottish MPs were neutral on abolition in 1804 but voted against a year later. Thus, Dundas’ 
delay arguably lasted from 1796 to 1805 (it would likely have extended to 1806, given the 
time abolition took to implement). This period is close to the eight-year term suggested in his 
own proposals of 23 April 1792. The remainder of the delay was ensured by other British 
parliamentarians.  
Gradual abolition was not an executive decision: it was the collective will of the 
British Parliament, whilst it was merchants who trafficked African people. However, that 
should not detract from Dundas’ significant, individual role in the House of Commons. 
Without his practical opposition, immediate abolition could have passed earlier. Given the 
global interest, this article goes beyond the assessment of the one man’s parliamentary 
culpability and offers substantiated clarity to inform international debate. Modern re-
contextualisation can never convey the full story of parliamentary affairs nor the horrors of 
the transatlantic trafficking in enslaved people but this article elucidates the activities of an 
individual who helped prolong its continuation in an era when many in British society 
considered it an odious evil. Henry Dundas was a ‘great delayer’ of the abolition of the 
transatlantic slave trade. 
